Voluntary contributions and collective redistribution

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)149-173
Number of pages25
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume8
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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