Voter strategies with restricted choice menus

Kenneth Benoit, Daniela Giannetti, Michael Laver

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


    Mixed-member electoral systems require voters simultaneously to cast ballots in single-member districts (SMD) and multimember, proportional representation (PR) constituencies. It may be that not all parties offer candidates in both electoral contexts, however. In this event would-be voters for some parties may find themselves 'frustrated' by the restricted choice menu on offer in the SMD, being effectively forced to split their vote between different parties. Here we explore the different behaviours of frustrated voters in the 1996 mixed-member election to Italy's Chamber of Deputies, characterizing these as being either in some sense non-strategic (concerned above all with the relative policy platforms of candidates) or strategic (concerned above all to influence the eventual composition of government). Using an extended method for ecological inference, we parameterize and estimate rates of different types of ticket-splitting at the district level, and link the degree of what we characterize as strategic voting to the relative policy distance between the respective local representatives of the Italian pre-electoral coalitions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)459-485
    Number of pages27
    JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Jul 2006

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Political Science and International Relations


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