TY - JOUR
T1 - What the numbers say
T2 - A digit-based test for election fraud
AU - Beber, Bernd
AU - Scacco, Alexandra
N1 - Funding Information:
We provide an extensive discussion of the latter concern when we turn to the empirical analysis below. Here, we address the former issue and provide evidence that fraudulent numbers sometimes do go hand-in-hand with nonequifrequent last digits. We highlight a set of findings from the Office of Research Integrity (ORI), which oversees, supports, and sets policies for investigations of alleged misconduct in health research. The ORI forms part of the Department of Health and Human Services and directs integrity activities for a substantial share of federal research grants, including research sponsored by the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Is it possible to detect manipulation by looking only at electoral returns? Drawing on work in psychology, we exploit individuals' biases in generating numbers to highlight suspicious digit patterns in reported vote counts. First, we show that fair election procedures produce returns where last digits occur with equal frequency, but laboratory experiments indicate that individuals tend to favor some numerals over others, even when subjects have incentives to properly randomize. Second, individuals underestimate the likelihood of digit repetition in sequences of random integers, so we should observe relatively few instances of repeated numbers in manipulated vote tallies. Third, laboratory experiments demonstrate a preference for pairs of adjacent digits, which suggests that such pairs should be abundant on fraudulent return sheets. Fourth, subjects avoid pairs of distant numerals, so those should appear with lower frequency on tainted returns. We test for deviations in digit patterns using data from Sweden's 2002 parliamentary elections, Senegal's 2000 and 2007 presidential elections, and previously unavailable results from Nigeria's 2003 presidential election. In line with observers' expectations, we find substantial evidence that manipulation occurred in Nigeria as well as in Senegal in 2007.
AB - Is it possible to detect manipulation by looking only at electoral returns? Drawing on work in psychology, we exploit individuals' biases in generating numbers to highlight suspicious digit patterns in reported vote counts. First, we show that fair election procedures produce returns where last digits occur with equal frequency, but laboratory experiments indicate that individuals tend to favor some numerals over others, even when subjects have incentives to properly randomize. Second, individuals underestimate the likelihood of digit repetition in sequences of random integers, so we should observe relatively few instances of repeated numbers in manipulated vote tallies. Third, laboratory experiments demonstrate a preference for pairs of adjacent digits, which suggests that such pairs should be abundant on fraudulent return sheets. Fourth, subjects avoid pairs of distant numerals, so those should appear with lower frequency on tainted returns. We test for deviations in digit patterns using data from Sweden's 2002 parliamentary elections, Senegal's 2000 and 2007 presidential elections, and previously unavailable results from Nigeria's 2003 presidential election. In line with observers' expectations, we find substantial evidence that manipulation occurred in Nigeria as well as in Senegal in 2007.
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U2 - 10.1093/pan/mps003
DO - 10.1093/pan/mps003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84860250065
SN - 1047-1987
VL - 20
SP - 211
EP - 234
JO - Political Analysis
JF - Political Analysis
IS - 2
ER -