TY - GEN
T1 - What to lock? Functional and parametric locking
AU - Yasin, Muhammad
AU - Sengupta, Abhrajit
AU - Schafer, Benjamin Carrion
AU - Makris, Yiorgos
AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur
AU - Rajendran, Jeyavijayan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 ACM.
PY - 2017/5/10
Y1 - 2017/5/10
N2 - Logic locking is an intellectual property (IP) protection technique that prevents IP piracy, reverse engineering and overbuilding attacks by the untrusted foundry or end-users. Existing logic locking techniques are all based on locking the functionality; the design/chip is nonfunctional unless the secret key has been loaded. Existing techniques are vulnerable to various attacks, such as sensitization, key-pruning, and signal skew analysis enabled removal attacks. In this paper, we propose a tenacious and traceless logic locking technique, TTlock, that locks functionality and provably withstands all known attacks, such as SAT-based, sensitization, removal, etc. TTLock protects a secret input pattern; the output of a logic cone is ipped for that pattern, where this ip is restored only when the correct key is applied. Experimental results confirm our theoretical expectations that the computational complexity of attacks launched on TTLock grows exponentially with increasing key-size, while the area, power, and delay overhead increases only linearly. In this paper, we also coin "parametric locking," where the design/chip behaves as per its specifications (performance, power, reliability, etc.) only with the secret key in place, and an incorrect key downgrades its parametric characteristics. We discuss objectives and challenges in parametric locking.
AB - Logic locking is an intellectual property (IP) protection technique that prevents IP piracy, reverse engineering and overbuilding attacks by the untrusted foundry or end-users. Existing logic locking techniques are all based on locking the functionality; the design/chip is nonfunctional unless the secret key has been loaded. Existing techniques are vulnerable to various attacks, such as sensitization, key-pruning, and signal skew analysis enabled removal attacks. In this paper, we propose a tenacious and traceless logic locking technique, TTlock, that locks functionality and provably withstands all known attacks, such as SAT-based, sensitization, removal, etc. TTLock protects a secret input pattern; the output of a logic cone is ipped for that pattern, where this ip is restored only when the correct key is applied. Experimental results confirm our theoretical expectations that the computational complexity of attacks launched on TTLock grows exponentially with increasing key-size, while the area, power, and delay overhead increases only linearly. In this paper, we also coin "parametric locking," where the design/chip behaves as per its specifications (performance, power, reliability, etc.) only with the secret key in place, and an incorrect key downgrades its parametric characteristics. We discuss objectives and challenges in parametric locking.
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U2 - 10.1145/3060403.3060492
DO - 10.1145/3060403.3060492
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85021194304
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI
SP - 351
EP - 356
BT - GLSVLSI 2017 - Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 27th Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI 2017
Y2 - 10 May 2017 through 12 May 2017
ER -