Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain's "age of reform"

Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)707-765
    Number of pages59
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
    Volume119
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2004

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    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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