Why moral psychology is disturbing

Regina A. Rini

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0766-4

Why moral psychology is disturbing

Regina A. Rini

Global Public Health

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Learning the psychological origins of our moral judgments can lead us to lose confidence in them. In this paper I explain why. I consider two explanations drawn from existing literature—regarding epistemic unreliability and automaticity—and argue that neither is fully adequate. I then propose a new explanation, according to which psychological research reveals the extent to which we are disturbingly disunified as moral agents.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1439-1458
Number of pages	20
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	174
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0766-4
State	Published - Jun 1 2017

Keywords

Doxastic embarrassment
Moral intuition
Moral judgment
Moral psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1007/s11098-016-0766-4

Cite this

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Why moral psychology is disturbing

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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