Abstract
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in contests. In the aggregate the behavior of subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory, but we find that such aggregate results mask an unexpected compositional effect on the individual level. Whereas theory predicts that subject efforts are continuous and increasing functions of ability, the actual efforts of our laboratory subjects bifurcate. Low-ability workers drop out and exert little or no effort, and high-ability workers try too hard. This bifurcation, which is masked by aggregation, can be explained by assuming loss aversion on the part of the subjects. (JEL: C92, D44, D72, D82, J31)
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 717-743 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2010 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance