TY - GEN
T1 - You have been warned
T2 - 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2022
AU - Bitsikas, Evangelos
AU - Pöpper, Christina
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 ACM.
PY - 2022/12/5
Y1 - 2022/12/5
N2 - The Public Warning System (PWS) is an essential part of cellular networks and a country's civil protection. Warnings can notify users of hazardous events (e. g., floods, earthquakes) and crucial national matters that require immediate attention. PWS attacks disseminating fake warnings or concealing precarious events can have a serious impact, causing fraud, panic, physical harm, or unrest to users within an affected area. In this work, we conduct the first comprehensive investigation of PWS security in 5G networks. We demonstrate five practical attacks that may impact the security of 5G-based Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS) as well as Earthquake and Tsunami Warning System (ETWS) alerts. Additional to identifying the vulnerabilities, we investigate two PWS spoofing and three PWS suppression attacks, with or without a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker. We discover that MitM-based attacks have more severe impact than their non-MitM counterparts. Our PWS barring attack is an effective technique to eliminate legitimate warning messages. We perform a rigorous analysis of the roaming aspect of the PWS, incl. its potentially secure version, and report the implications of our attacks on other emergency features (e. g., 911 SIP calls). We discuss possible countermeasures and note that eradicating the attacks necessitates a scrupulous reevaluation of the PWS design and a secure implementation.
AB - The Public Warning System (PWS) is an essential part of cellular networks and a country's civil protection. Warnings can notify users of hazardous events (e. g., floods, earthquakes) and crucial national matters that require immediate attention. PWS attacks disseminating fake warnings or concealing precarious events can have a serious impact, causing fraud, panic, physical harm, or unrest to users within an affected area. In this work, we conduct the first comprehensive investigation of PWS security in 5G networks. We demonstrate five practical attacks that may impact the security of 5G-based Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS) as well as Earthquake and Tsunami Warning System (ETWS) alerts. Additional to identifying the vulnerabilities, we investigate two PWS spoofing and three PWS suppression attacks, with or without a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker. We discover that MitM-based attacks have more severe impact than their non-MitM counterparts. Our PWS barring attack is an effective technique to eliminate legitimate warning messages. We perform a rigorous analysis of the roaming aspect of the PWS, incl. its potentially secure version, and report the implications of our attacks on other emergency features (e. g., 911 SIP calls). We discuss possible countermeasures and note that eradicating the attacks necessitates a scrupulous reevaluation of the PWS design and a secure implementation.
KW - 5G
KW - MitM attacks
KW - Public Warning System
KW - spoofing
KW - suppression
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85144078605&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85144078605&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3564625.3568000
DO - 10.1145/3564625.3568000
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85144078605
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 561
EP - 575
BT - Proceedings - 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2022
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 5 December 2022 through 9 December 2022
ER -